




Chapter 8: Why the Conservatives lost their majority—but still won 
John Bartle 
 
When Theresa May stepped into the glare of the television lights in Downing Street 
on 18 April to announce a ‘snap’ general election, there was almost universal 
agreement that she had made an astute if not brilliant call. It was widely assumed that 
the forthcoming campaign would centre on Brexit Britain’s future outside of the 
European Union. It was even more widely assumed that the Conservatives would win.  
The first assumption, that the 2017 election would be the ‘Brexit election’, 
seemed unimpeachable. Britain’s relations with Europe had long consumed the 
attention of its political elite. David Cameron’s attempts to renegotiate the terms of 
Britain’s membership of the EU had absorbed the prime minister’s energies during his 
brief second term. Britain had then undergone the national trauma of a referendum 
campaign that resulted in a vote to leave, defeat for Cameron and his replacement 
with Theresa May. The complex process of withdrawal had then dominated the new 
government’s agenda. Announcing the election the new prime minister characterised 
the choice as one between: 
 
strong and stable leadership in the national interest, with me as your Prime 
Minister, or weak and unstable coalition government, led by Jeremy Corbyn, 
propped up by the Liberal Democrats—who want to reopen the divisions of 
the referendum—and Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP.1 
 
The second assumption, that the election would result in an easy Tory victory, 





the EU, it was hard to believe that the electorate would replace the Conservatives with 
Labour, a party largely devoted to the European Union. The Tories had entered 
January 2017 with a 16-point opinion-poll lead over their main rivals. By April 2017 
this lead had stretched to 20 points. May’s decision also caught everyone on the hop. 
Labour under Jeremy Corbyn seemed singularly unprepared to fight the election, the 
Liberal Democrats were still a ‘toxic’ brand after their five years in coalition between 
2010 and 2015, and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) were in disarray 
having secured and effectively won the recent referendum. Meanwhile, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) posed no obvious threat to the Conservatives, whose 2015 
majority was based almost entirely on English and Welsh MPs. For these reasons a 
Tory victory seemed inevitable. A survey of experts for the United Kingdom’s 
Political Studies Association produced an average forecast vote of 43 per cent for the 
Conservatives and 29 per cent for Labour, and an average Tory majority of 92 seats.2 
A review published in the Washington Post produced a similar consensus.3 Martin 
Boon of ICM Research declared that ‘the result is going to be a foregone 
conclusion’.4   
In the event, neither the campaign nor the outcome conformed to expectations. 
Labour’s decision to accept that Britain was leaving the EU sucked much of the 
oxygen from the issue. Europe dominated the campaign’s early skirmishes, but the 
publication of the manifestos shifted attention to public spending, the economy and 
defence. The 2017 general election campaign was not, therefore, a replay of the 2016 
referendum: attitudes towards Brexit were merely an additional influence on top of 
other enduring influences. And once votes were counted, it was clear that there would 
be no landslide Tory victory. The Conservatives scraped home as the largest party but 






The aggregate outcome 
Before analysing why the election resulted in a hung parliament, it is worth 
establishing the ‘facts’ about the 2017 general election. The most important fact is 
that the Conservative party ‘won’ the election, in that they gained more votes and 
seats than any other party (see table 8.1), and Theresa May continued as prime 
minister.5 The party’s share of the vote was higher than under Cameron in either 2010 
or 2015, and saw the largest increase (5.5 percentage points) achieved by any 
governing party since 1945. Viewed in isolation this was a remarkable achievement. 
 
TABLE 8.1: The outcome of the 2017 United Kingdom general election  
 
 Votes (%) Seats 
2017 Change 2017 Change 
Con 42.4 +5.5 317 -13 
Lab 40.0 +9.5 262 +30 
SNP 3.0 -1.7 35 -21 
Lib Dem 7.4 -0.5 12 +4 
DUP 0.9 +0.3 10 +2 
Sinn Fein 0.7 +0.1 7 +3 
Plaid Cymru 0.5 -0.1 4 +1 
UKIP 1.8 -10.8 0 -1 
Green 1.6 -1.8 1 0 
Others 1.7 -0.5 2 -6 
 
Source: House of Commons library 
 
But the Conservative performance cannot be viewed in isolation. Because of 
pre-election expectations, the party’s victory felt like an emotional defeat. For similar 
reasons, Labour’s defeat felt like an emotional—even euphoric—victory. Labour’s 
share of the vote rocketed by 9.6 points to 40 per cent, exceeding its supporters’ 
wildest dreams and bolstering Jeremy Corbyn’s authority, as Thomas Quinn describes 





achieved by either of the two major parties since 1945.6 The net effect was that the 
Conservatives’ lead over Labour fell from 6.4 points in 2015 to 2.3 points in 2017.  
As the fortunes of the major parties improved, those of the smaller parties 
waned. As Paul Whiteley, Harold Clarke and Matthew Goodwin recount in chapter 4, 
UKIP received just 1.8 per cent of the vote, down 10.8 points compared with 2015. 
The party also lost its only seat in Clacton on the Essex coast. The Liberal Democrat 
vote fell to 7.4 per cent, down 0.5 points on its already low 2015 vote. Bizarrely, the 
electoral system translated this loss into a net gain of four seats. In Scotland, the SNP 
suffered a major rebuff. Its share of the UK vote fell from 4.7 to 3.0 per cent and its 
share of the Scottish vote fell from 50.0 to 36.9 per cent. The party lost a total of 21 
seats, 12 to the Tories, six to Labour and three to the Liberal Democrats. In Wales, 
Plaid Cymru failed to make headway in the face of a Labour revival. The Green 
party’s share fell from 3.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent, though Caroline Lucas retained her 
seat in Brighton Pavilion. 
 
The flow of the vote 
The aggregate election outcome provides an indication of the net changes that 
occurred between 2015 and 2017. Underneath the surface, however, were millions of 
individual changes, some of which cancelled out others. Table 8.2 illustrates these 
complex movements by displaying how individual respondents to the British Election 
Study (BES) reported having voted immediately after both the 2015 and 2017 general 
elections.7 Table 8.2 suggests that around 84 per cent of all 2015 Tory voters again 
voted for that party in 2017. Similarly, 81 per cent of 2015 Labour voters voted 
Labour in 2017. The aggregate-level evidence from the constituencies confirms the 





their vote in 2017. Nevertheless, table 8.2 also shows that there was considerable 
switching. One in ten 2015 Labour voters defected to the Tories in 2017, and one in 
twelve 2015 Tory voters made the opposite journey.8  
 
TABLE 8.2: The flow of the vote, 2015–2017 
 
 Vote in 2017 General Election 





Con 83.8 8.3 5.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Lab 9.4 80.9 5.9 0.8 0.2 0.7 1.3 
Lib Dem 17.7 22.8 54.6 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.5 
SNP 8.5 16.3 2.0 71.8 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Plaid Cymru 5.8 38.4 1.2 0.0 52.3 0.0 1.2 
UKIP 56.1 17.0 3.6 0.1 0.8 18.2 1.8 
Green 4.7 58.2 13.2 2.6 0.3 0.6 16.5 
Did not vote 30.8 51.1 8.6 2.0 0.7 1.3 2.7 
 
Source: British Election Study, Internet panel study 2015-17, post-election waves 6 
and 13 
 
The behaviour of 2015 minor-party voters, relatively few of whom remained 
loyal, provides further clues about the forces shaping the 2017 general election. One 
of the most striking findings in Table 8.2 is that 56 per cent of 2015 UKIP votes 
switched to the Conservatives. This matches the aggregate-level evidence: at the 
constituency level, the UKIP vote in 2015 strongly predicts the Conservative vote in 
2017. It appears that the referendum vote and Theresa May’s increasingly hard-line on 
Brexit helped produce a realignment on the right. Nevertheless, some 17 per cent of 
2015 UKIP voters switched to Labour in 2017. Brexit was far from the whole story. 
There is also some evidence of a realignment on the left. Fully 58 per cent of 
2015 Green party voters switched to Labour, and the Greens’ vote share in 2015 was 
strongly associated with Labour’s vote share in 2017 at the constituency level. The 





party voters.  Finally, some 23 per cent of 2015 Liberal Democrat voters switched to 
Labour and 18 per cent to the Tories. This slight tendency among centrist voters to 
switch to Labour suggests the tide was moving leftwards. 
Table 8.2 also illustrates some of the political dynamics in Scotland and 
Wales. Fully 16 per cent, or one in six, of 2015 SNP voters switched to Labour, and 
nearly 9 per cent or one in ten turned to the Conservatives. In Wales Plaid Cymru 
failed to hold onto many of its former voters. Some 38 per cent defected to Labour. 
Both sets of movements are consistent with Robert Johns’ argument in chapter 5 that 
the anticipated Tory landslide encouraged Nationalist voters to engage more closely 
with Westminster politics and take sides accordingly. 
One final intriguing thing to note about the data in table 8.2 is the behaviour of 
former non-voters. Most (54 per cent) of 2015 non-voters again did not vote in 2017, 
but of those who voted, 51 per cent chose Labour and 31 per cent Conservative.9 The 
aggregate-level evidence suggests that Labour’s vote increased and the Conservatives’ 
decreased as turnout increased.10 In the run up to the election, many experts expressed 
doubts whether non-voters could make a difference. The experts, as with their 
predictions of the outcome, were wrong. Nevertheless, the substantial conversion of 
non-voters to the Tories suggests that pledges to reassert national sovereignty and to 
‘take back control’ could mobilise voters just as much as pledges to ‘end austerity’. 
 
The dealigned electorate 
The 2017 general election witnessed a significant exodus of voters from the smaller to 
the larger parties. Just 64 per cent of those who voted cast their ballot for the same 
party in elections just two years apart. Clearly, the electorate was changeable. A clue 





levels of party non-identification as measured by successive BES surveys.11 Over 
time, the proportion of non-identifiers—those saying they do not think of themselves 
as ‘Conservative’, ‘Labour’, ‘Liberal Democrat’ or ‘Nationalist’—has greatly 
increased, from 5 per cent in 1964 to 19 per cent in 2015. Since voters who strongly 
identify with a party are more likely to remain loyal to that party and turn out, any 
increase in the number of non-identifiers increases the pool of floating voters. At the 
same time, the strength of identification among the smaller pool of partisans has 
waned. In 1964, some 47 per cent of all identifiers thought of themselves as ‘very 
strong’ partisans and a mere 11 per cent thought of themselves as ‘not very strong’ 
identifiers. By 2015, a mere 21 per cent of respondents described themselves as ‘very 
strong’ identifiers and 25 per cent described themselves as ‘not very strong’.  
 
FIGURE 8.1: Non-identification with political parties, 1964–2015 
 
 
Source: British Election Study, Information System 
 
Weakened party loyalties are partly a product of long-term social changes such 





individuals’ dependence on social groups for information. They are also a product of 
past ideological movements by the parties towards the extremes, which loosened 
voters’ psychological bonds.12 The same ties have weakened furthers as parties have 
failed to deliver in office. By 2015, the Liberal Democrats as well as the 
Conservatives and Labour had gained experience of governing, and all were judged to 
have ‘failed’ the public in one way or another. They had also done things to cast doubt 
on their integrity. The cash-for-questions scandal in the 1990s, the Iraq War of 2003, 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the MPs expenses scandal of 2009 all stimulated anti-
system sentiment.13 These sentiments were amplified by a cynical media.14 
The weakening of partisan loyalties means that, other things being equal, 
short-term factors have a stronger impact on voting behaviour. Voters can be swayed 
by policy, the state of the economy or the populist appeals of anti-system parties. In 
the past, the Liberal Democrats were a convenient vehicle for protest votes. In 2015 
UKIP successfully appealed to those who felt ignored by the ‘Westminster elites’, 
particularly on the issues of European integration and immigration. In 2017 both 
major party leaders tried to position themselves as anti-system. Theresa May, for 
example, claimed to represent the ‘mainstream of the British public’ who had been 
ignored by ‘elites in Westminster’. Jeremy Corbyn spoke on behalf of ‘the many not 
the few’ and argued that the poor should not be punished for the failures of the 
bankers that caused the great recession.15 
 
The social basis of the vote 
Voting behaviour is rooted in people’s social experiences. Voters’ age, race, sex, 
education, social class and neighbourhood can profoundly shape their identities, 





shape their policy preferences, evaluations of national or personal conditions and 
assessments of which party or leader is most likely to deliver.  
In 2017 age emerged as a new fault line in British electoral politics: younger 
voters were far more likely to vote Labour than the old. These differences were not 
entirely new. In 2015, the Labour vote among 18-24 year olds was 43 per cent, 
compared with 23 per cent among those aged 65 and above. Conversely, the 
Conservative vote was just 27 per cent among 18-24 year olds and 47 per cent among 
those aged 65 and above. These differences reflected the old adages about youthful 
radicalism being replaced by conservatism in old-age.17 In 2015 they also had more 
immediate sources. Labour, under Ed Miliband’s leadership, made a pitch for the 
youth vote, promising to reduce university tuition fees from £9,000 to £6,000 per 
year. This strategy had limited success, yielding just a 6-point lead among 18-29 year 
olds, and aroused little enthusiasm. Turnout among this group was just 43 per cent. 
Table 8.3 shows how existing differences between the young and old widened 
considerably in 2017. Labour’s lead over the Tories was fully 35-points among 18-24 
year olds, 29-points among 25-34 year olds and 16-points among those aged 35-45. In 
contrast, the Tories enjoyed a 3-point lead over Labour among those aged 45-54, 
which jumped to 17 points among 55-64 year olds and 36 points among those aged 65 
and above. Similarly, at a constituency level, Labour’s share of the vote was 
associated with the proportion of the population aged 18-29.18 In 2017 discussion 
about the causes and consequences of this new inter-generational politics, in which 
‘millennials’ were seemingly set against ‘baby boomers’, moved from the seminar to 








TABLE 8.3: How Britain voted in2017, Ipsos MORI 
 
 Con Lab Lib Dem Con lead Turnout 
Age      
18-24 27 62 5 -35 54 
25-34 27 56 9 -29 55 
35-44 33 49 10 -16 56 
45-54 43 40 7 +3 66 
44-64 51 34 7 +17 71 
65+ 61 25 7 +36 71 
      
Gender      
Female 43 42 8 +1 62 
Male 44 40 7 +4  
      
Ethnic group      
White 45 39 8 +6 64 
BME 19 73 6 -54 53 
      
Education      
No qualifications 52 35 4 +17 60 
Other qualifications 46 39 6 +7 61 
Degree and above 33 48 12 -15 69 
      
Class      
AB 47 37 10 +10 69 
C1 44 40 7 +4 68 
C2 45 41 6 +4 60 
DE 38 47 5 -9 53 
      
Tenure      
Owned 55 30 7 +25 70 
Mortgage 43 40 9 +3 68 
Social renter 26 57 4 -31 52 




The reasons for this widening gap in 2017 are necessarily speculative. Some 
relate to the immediate political context. Young voters were more likely to vote 
Remain in the 2016 referendum, and Theresa May’s subsequent commitment to a 
‘hard’ Brexit alienated them. The Liberal Democrats, despite their pro-Europeanism, 





naturally gravitated towards Labour. The new generational divide also reflected 
political interests. Younger voters were more vulnerable to changes in the workplace 
and zero-hours contracts. Many welfare reforms, such as restrictions on housing 
benefit, affected the young most. Students entering higher education in 2017 from the 
poorest 40 per cent of families were forecast to graduate with debts of £57,000.19 
They increasingly found it difficult to find ‘graduate’ jobs or get a foot on the housing 
ladder. For ‘generation rent’ the dream of owning a property remained just that—a 
dream. Labour’s promise to abolish tuition fees and re-introduce grants in 2017 
appealed to younger voters’ self-interest. So did Labour’s promises to regulate rents in 
the private sector. Older voters, on the other hand, were less likely to work, more 
likely to own their own homes, and were protected by the ‘triple lock’ on pensions. 
The Tories’ proposals to change the rules on social care and winter-fuel payments 
tested their loyalties. In the zero-sum game of intergenerational politics, however, 
Labour’s pull on the young may have also pushed the old towards the Tories.  
Another factor driving young voters to Labour was undoubtedly a ‘Corbyn 
effect’. Most politicians paid little attention to the young. They doubted whether 
young people could be induced to vote and whether it would make a difference if they 
did. Instead, most politicians ‘wisely’ focussed on the ‘grey vote’ that could be relied 
on to turn out. Here, as elsewhere, Corbyn cast doubt on the conventional wisdom and 
focussed on youth. The scale of Labour’s pledge to abolish tuition fees was breath-
taking. It was estimated to cost £11 billion per year. Young people responded to this 
attention with enthusiasm. Such was Corbyn’s personal appeal that those aspects of 
his record that raised questions among older voters counted in his favour among the 
young. His rebelliousness on the Iraq War was taken to illustrate his commitment to 





to conform. His dull speaking style and failure to deliver carefully prepared 
soundbites were evidence of his authenticity. Remarkably, he was generally absolved 
of charges of ‘careerism’, despite being an MP for over thirty years. Endorsements by 
musicians—for instance, the ‘Grime4Corbyn’ movement—and organs such as the 
New Musical Express (NME) music magazine, created a sense of excitement. 
Labour’s unexpected gains in constituencies like Canterbury, Reading West and 
Kensington owed much to the efforts of students in particular. 
The 2017 ‘youthquake’ not only altered the share of the vote but did 
something to alter the size and composition of the registered electorate. As Sarah 
Birch shows in chapter 7, the start of the campaign witnessed a surge in voter-
registration applications, driven in part by a campaign led by the National Union of 
Students. There were 2.9 million applications to register between the announcement 
of the snap election on 19 April and the deadline on 22 May. Fully 96 per cent of 
these applications were made online and 69 per cent of these online applications were 
made by voters below 34. The impact of all this was limited since many were 
duplicate applications. Nevertheless, Ipsos MORI estimates that turnout among 18-24 
year olds increased by 11-points to 54 per cent. Older voters were still more likely to 
vote than the young but voted at similar or slightly lower levels than in 2015. These 
differential changes benefitted Labour.20 
While the impact of age increased, that of social class declined. For much of 
the post-war period voting behaviour was rooted in social class. The middle class—
those in non-manual occupations—tended to think of themselves as Conservative, 
while the working class—those in manual occupations—tended to think of themselves 
as Labour. Over time, the relationship between class and party declined. Nevertheless, 





cent of the vote from the ABs (those in managerial and professional occupations), 41 
per cent from the C1s (clerical occupations, administrators and salespersons), 34 per 
cent among the C2s (skilled manual workers) and just 28 per cent from the DEs 
(semi- or unskilled manual workers). Labour received 28 per cent from the ABs, 30 
per cent from the C1s, 33 per cent from the C2s and 42 per cent from the DEs.  
By historical standards, the relationship between class and party was already 
weak by 2015, but as table 8.3 shows, it was even weaker in 2017. The Tory vote 
among the ABs was just 9-points higher than among the DEs, compared with 16-
points in 2015. The Labour vote among the DEs was just 10-points higher than the 
ABs, compared with 14-points in 2015. The Tories, moreover, enjoyed a 4-point lead 
among the C2s, the skilled working class.  
The most obvious reason for the further weakening of the association between 
class and vote between 2015 and 2017 was undoubtedly Europe. Working-class voters 
were far more likely to think that European immigration depressed their incomes and 
imposed burdens on the public services, as discussed in chapter 4. They tended to vote 
Leave. In 2017 Labour reduced the salience of Brexit by accepting the result of the 
referendum but Brexit gave the Conservatives an opportunity to claim that Labour had 
abandoned the working class for a metropolitan elite. This strategy appealed as much 
to the social conservatism of parts of the working class as much as anti-immigration 
feeling, and was partly successful. The Tories gained five seats with high Leave votes: 
Mansfield, North East Derbyshire, Middlesborough South and East Cleveland, Stoke-
on-Trent South and Walsall North.21 These gains, however, were far fewer than the 
Tories had hoped and entirely offset by losses in the southern middle-class seats that 
had voted Remain. Seats like Battersea and Bristol North West swung to Labour as a 





tuition fees may have also reduced class voting since it was most likely to benefit 
middle-class children and middle-class parents. 
As the association between class and vote waned, that between education and 
vote increased. As table 8.3 shows, the Conservative vote peaked at 52 per cent 
among those with no qualifications, fell to 46 per cent among those with some 
qualifications and fell to just 33 per cent among graduates. The profile for Labour 
voters was a mirror image, rising from 35 per cent among the least educated to 39 per 
cent among those with some qualifications, and peaking at 48 per cent among 
graduates. These differences in part reflect the fact that older voters were less likely to 
be educated. They also reflect the fact that the educated were far more likely to vote 
Remain and were more supportive of an ‘open’ UK.  
Housing continued to play a role in shaping party preferences. The Tories have 
generally favoured a ‘property owning democracy’ and Labour has supported social 
housing. Not surprisingly, therefore, fully 55 per cent of those who owned their own 
home voted Conservative compared to 30 per cent who voted Labour. Those with a 
mortgage divided 43 to 40 per cent in the Tories’ favour, while social and private 
renters plumped for Labour. These differences again reflect age and education. Older 
and better educated people are more likely to own their home. The young are more 
geographically mobile and likely to rent. Labour’s share among private renters leapt 
from 39 per cent in 2015 to 54 per cent in 2017. Labour’s promises to control rents 
proved attractive to hard-pressed tenants.  
Table 8.3 suggests that Labour received slightly more support from women 
than men. The Tories had a lead of 4-points among men but were just 1-point ahead 
among women. Since women tend to live longer and older voters are more likely to 





notes in chapter 6 there was also a striking relationship between gender, age and vote. 
Labour’s support among men aged 18-24 was 16-points, nowhere near as large as its 
55-point lead among women of the same age.  
Ethnicity also played a visible role in vote choice in 2017. The Conservatives’ 
share of the ‘white’ vote rose from 39 per cent in 2015 to 45 per cent in 2017. 
Labour’s share rose from 28 per cent in 2015 to 39 per cent in 2017. The 
Conservatives’ share of the BME vote, on the other hand, fell from 23 to 19 per cent, 
while Labour’s rose from 65 to 73 per cent. Both groups swung to Labour, though 
BMEs swung more. Jeremy Corbyn’s reputation as a campaigner on equality may 
have drawn ethnic minority voters back to Labour. The Conservatives’ rhetoric on 
Europe and immigration may have had the opposite impact. 
 
Austerity and the policy mood 
Austerity defined both the Coalition government and Conservative governments. The 
Coalition Agreement promised to reduce the deficit primarily by reducing spending.22 
While the health and overseas aid budgets were protected, all others were subject to 
cuts. Between 2011 and 2016 the Departmental Expenditure Limits (DELs) for local 
government were reduced by 51 per cent.23 The impact of cuts was mitigated by 
efficiency drives, new working practices and technology. Nevertheless, the scale of 
the savings meant that frontline services were affected. Many Sure Start centres, 
designed to support parents back into work, were closed. Other cuts hurt the elderly 
poor. By 2014, 150,000 pensioners had lost access to help with washing and 
dressing.24 The cuts even affected areas traditionally favoured by the Conservatives. 
The DELs for the Justice Department and Defence departments were cut by 34 and 14 





Britons generally support a ‘cradle to the grave’ welfare state. The British 
Social Attitudes (BSA) survey has regularly invited people to ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ 
with the proposition that ‘the creation of the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest 
achievements’.  Responses in 2015 were typical: around 57 per cent agreed and a 
mere 11 per cent disagreed.26 Those who receive no welfare still benefit from public 
services.27 Few people have private health insurance and most rely on the NHS, 
especially for GP and accident and emergency services.  Most people send their 
children to state-funded schools. Those living in urban areas rely on public transport. 
Not surprisingly, Britons prefer more spending on these things.  The same Britons, 
however, pay taxes. Equally unsurprisingly, they prefer lower taxes.  
In short, most Britons are ambivalent about the state.28 They want it to act, in 
the form of doing something about unemployment and to provide public services and 
a safety net. They also worry about the consequences of the state doing too much, in 
the form of higher taxes, regulation, bureaucracy and the sapping of incentives and 
personal responsibility.29 This ambivalence implies that their preferences about 
government activity depend, at least in part, on current policy. When policy moves 
left and governments increase spending and taxes, people come to want less activity 
than before. When policy moves right and governments reduce spending and taxes, 
people come to want more activity than before. Policy preferences respond 
‘thermostatically’, moving in the opposite direction to policy.30  
Between 2010 and 2017 the government’s tax and spending policies shifted to 
the right. Total managed expenditure fell from 45.3 per cent of GDP in 2009-10, to 
39.4 per cent of GDP in 2016-17 (see Figure 1.2). Even in respect of areas where 
spending was protected, such as the NHS, there was a growing sense that the public 





demands resulting from the failure to fund social care, added to concerns. A Kings 
Fund survey in June 2017 reported that 43 per cent of all NHS Trust finance directors 
were forecasting a deficit.31 The BSA has regularly asked respondents whether the 
NHS was getting better or worse over the last five years. In 2009, during Labour’s last 
full-year in office, 41 per cent thought it was getting better and 19 per cent thought it 
was getting worse, a net score of +21. By 2016, 25 per cent thought it was getting 
better and 36 per cent worse, a net score of -11.32 Just as in the 1990s, the Tories were 
associated with social decay. Just as in the 1990s, this cost the party at the polls 33 
The Conservatives combined public-sector spending restraint with cuts in 
direct taxation.34 The Coalition had adopted the Liberal Democrat policy of 
progressively raising the personal threshold for income tax from £6,475 in 2009-10 to 
£10,000 by 2014-15 and then £11,000 by 2017-18.35 It had also scrapped Labour’s 
top rate of income tax of 50 per cent and introduced a new rate of 45 per cent for 
those earning above £150,000. Tax cuts simultaneously reduced public concerns 
about taxation and waste, and raised concerns about public services and inequality. 
This ‘thermostatic’ effect of the Conservative government’s policies is clear in 
the public’s changing responses to the same survey questions. From 1983 to 2016, for 
instance, the BSA has asked respondents whether they preferred to increase or 
decrease taxes and spending. In 2010, 34 per cent of respondents wanted to increase 
taxes and spending. This increased year by year until in 2016 support for higher taxes 
and spending stood at 48 per cent.36 There were parallel movements on welfare. In 
2010 only 30 per cent agreed that the government should spend more on welfare and 
64 per cent disagreed, a net score of -34. By 2016, 35 per cent agreed and some 30 per 
cent disagreed, a net score of +5. There were also movements on attitudes to equality. 





poor and 36 per cent disagreed, a net score of 0. By 2016 the same figures were 42 per 
cent and 28 per cent, producing a net score of +14. In each and every case, opinion 
had clearly moved leftwards. 
 




Source: Author’s estimates 
 
Movements in public opinion such as these can be aggregated to infer the 
public’s general left-right preferences or ‘policy mood’.37 Figure 8.2 displays the 
estimated policy mood from 1979 to 2017, using all the available data, from all 
sources. Scores above 50 indicate that there are more left than right preferences, and 
scores below 50 indicate that there are more right than left preferences. A score of 50 
represents a perfect balance. From 2010 to 2017 the mood in Britain clearly shifted 
leftwards. Moreover, statistical modelling in previous studies suggests the electorate 
moves left as unemployment increases and right as spending and direct taxation 
increases.38 Had unemployment not fallen between 2010 and 2017 (see Table 1.2) 





By 2014 the mood was roughly where it had been in 2005, the year of 
Labour’s third successive election victory. By 2017, it was roughly back to where it 
had been in 1999, just two years after New Labour’s triumph. It is, of course, 
necessary to put these developments in context. Britain had not become a radically 
left-wing nation. The public remains ambivalent about government activity. 
Aggregate public opinion evolves slowly. Nevertheless, on issue after issue and year 
after year, there were incremental movements in opinion that cumulated to produce a 
leftwards shift in mood. This movement directly shifted votes towards Labour, and it 
indirectly shifted more by ensuring that Labour’s messages on austerity, the public 
services, welfare, housing and inequality cut through. By contrast, Conservative 
arguments about the need for fiscal discipline had less traction. Not everyone was 
tired of austerity but the balance of opinion had shifted in Labour’s favour. 
 
Brexit 
Although the 2017 general election was not a re-run of the 2016 referendum, Brexit 
continued to arouse strong feelings and the parties were sufficiently distinctive for it 
to influence individual vote decisions.39 Of the three major parties, the Conservatives 
and the Liberal Democrats had the clearest positions. Theresa May repeated her 
mantra that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ throughout the campaign. The Liberal Democrats 
promised a second referendum on any deal. Labour’s policy was ambiguous. It 
accepted the vote for Brexit and that ‘freedom of movement will end when Britain 
leaves the European Union’.40 It also wanted to retain the benefits of the single market 
but was wholly vague on whether it wanted to remain inside the single market. Its 





Table 8.4 shows that support for Brexit divided Conservative and Labour 
voters. Fully 61 per cent of Leavers voted Conservative. Almost as strikingly, some 
50 per cent of Remainers voted Labour and 15 per cent Liberal Democrat. 
Nevertheless, large portions of voters cast general election votes at odds with their 
referendum vote. One quarter of Remainers still voted Conservative and one quarter 
of Leavers still voted Labour.  
 
TABLE 8.4: Brexit referendum vote and general election vote, 2017 
 
 Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other Total  
Remain 25.1 49.7 15.2 0.3 9.7 100 
Leave 60.9 24.0 3.6 5.5 6.0 100 
 
Source: British Election Study, internet study 
 
In order to gauge the impact of referendum voting on vote choice in 2017, 
Table 8.5 uses evidence gathered immediately after the 2015 election, the 2016 
referendum and 2017 election. Where referendum voting was aligned with the 2015 
vote, voters tended to stay loyal in 2017. Fully 87 per cent of 2015 Conservative 
voters who voted Leave in 2016 voted Tory again in 2017. Equally, 85 per cent of 
2015 Labour voters who voted Remain in 2016 voted Labour in 2017. Where 
referendum vote was misaligned with 2015 vote, people were less loyal. Only 69 per 
cent of 2015 Tory voters who voted Remain in 2016 stayed loyal in 2017 and only 72 
per cent of 2015 Labour voters who voted Leave voted Labour in 2017. Fully 12 per 
cent of 2015 Conservatives who voted Remain defected to Labour and 12 per cent 
went to the Liberal Democrats. Among 2015 Labour voters who voted Leave some 18 
per cent voted Conservative in 2017 and 2 per cent voted UKIP. The Liberal 





tactical reasons or out of disappointment with Labour’s policies. On the whole, 
however, Labour’s ambiguous position on Brexit seems to have been enough to keep 
potential defectors on board.  
 
TABLE 8.5: The impact of Brexit on vote switching, 2015-17 
 
2015 Vote Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP (N) 
Conservative      
Leave 87.4 9.3 1.1 0.8 1198 
Remain 69.4 16.2 11.6 0.2 844 
Labour      
Leave 18.3 72.0 3.0 3.7 629 
Remain 4.0 85.4 7.4 0.0 1069 
Liberal Democrat      
Leave 28.2 21.9 56.3 0.0 124 
Remain 9.1 30.2 58.1 0.3 298 
UKIP      
Leave 58.5 13.2 2.6 21.4 646 
Remain 41.2 8.8 2.9 26.5 34 
 
Source: British Election Study, internet study 
 
 
The aggregate-level evidence tells a similar story. The estimated Brexit vote in 
the referendum in 2016 is a powerful predictor of Conservative and Labour vote at the 
constituency level in 2017 even controlling for previous vote share.42 The higher the 
Leave vote in 2016, the higher the Tory vote share a year later and the lower the 
Labour vote. Although Brexit was less visible in the campaign than many expected, 
its impact on election night was still clear in the results. 
 
The economy 
Elections are shaped by the economic context. Governments are generally re-elected 
when times are good and ejected when times are bad. Britain’s economic performance 





2011 to just 4.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2017, a forty three year low (see Table 
1.2). Inflation, moreover, was at 2 per cent and interest rates, which had been stuck at 
0.5 per cent since March 2009, were cut to just 0.25 per cent August 2016. Growth 
and productivity, however, were disappointing. 
The economic numbers in 2017 were mixed at best. But whatever the numbers 
indicated, most people did not feel the economy was getting better. Real earnings 
remained stubbornly below pre-2007 levels.43 The headline indicators, moreover, 
masked changes that made workers feel insecure. The new ‘gig’ economy left many 
workers feeling stressed and uncertain. As Britain prepared for Brexit, its labour 
markets appeared to be moving away from European protectionist models and 
towards US-style flexibility.  
The lingering impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and austerity were 
compounded by the fallout from European referendum. The pound depreciated from 
1.45 euros in June 2016 to 1.26 in April 2017, partly as a result of the cut in interest 
rates and partly because the markets downgraded the country’s future worth. Inflation 
nudged upwards, raising the prospect of interest-rate rises that would further erode 
real standards of living. Public sector workers had been subject to pay restraint for 
seven years. They grumbled loudly.  
Figure 8.3 displays Ipsos MORI’s monthly Economic Optimism Index (EOI) 
from 2010 to 2017.44 The index is the difference between the percentage of 
respondents who expect national economic conditions to get better and the percentage 
who expect things to get worse. The EOI had dipped below zero under the coalition 
but tracked upwards from 2013. The 2015 general election was fought against the 
backdrop of improving economic confidence. In April 2015 the EOI stood at +26. The 





This claim, together with the memory that the economy had crashed under Labour, 
gave the Tories a clear lead over Labour on economic competence in 2015 according 
to YouGov. The 2017 election, by contrast, was fought against the backdrop of post-
referendum uncertainty. In June 2016 the EOI stood at -10 but in July fell to -36. 
Theresa May’s arrival initially led to a burst of economic optimism. The EOI was still 
negative (-1) but heading upwards. As uncertainty increased, however, optimism 
declined. In January 2017 the index dipped to -20. Although it rose to -16 in April, it 
was 42 points below its 2015 level. These developments eroded confidence in the 
government’s economic policies. In March 2015 Ipsos-MORI found that 53 per cent 
of respondents agreed that ‘In the long term, this government's policies will improve 
the state of Britain’s economy’ and 39 per cent disagreed, a net score of +14. By 
March 2017 the equivalent figures were 44 per cent and 50 per cent, producing a net 
score of -6.45  
 










The costs of ruling 
The general election gave the public the opportunity to pass judgment on the 
government’s record. The Conservatives had been in power from May 2010 until June 
2017. They had presided over austerity and had been responsible for their fair share of 
policy blunders and U-turns. They had reorganised the NHS despite complaining 
loudly about previous ‘pointless’ reorganisations.46 They had introduced the so-called 
‘bedroom tax’ that was said to be responsible for splitting up families. The 
government found that almost every policy decision—let alone blunder—created a 
grievance among one group of voters or another. Like all governments everywhere 
and at all times, it was vulnerable to ‘the costs of ruling’, the tendency to lose support 
net of all other factors because it was blamed for everything.47 In 2015 the Tories had 
been protected from judgment on its record by its junior coalition partner. In 2015 the 
Liberal Democrats bore the electoral brunt of public anger and were all but wiped out. 
By 2017 the Conservatives had to take all the blame themselves. 
Figure 8.4 displays net satisfaction with the government—the percentage of 
respondents saying they were satisfied minus the percentage saying they were 
dissatisfied—from June 2010 right through to June 2017 as measured by Ipsos- 
MORI.48 Between 2010 and 2015 levels of net satisfaction broadly corresponded to a 
well-established pattern: a brief electoral honeymoon, followed by a long trough with 
consistently low satisfaction and a rally before the general election. The short 2015-17 
parliament displays some of the same U-shaped features. Net satisfaction was 
relatively high in late 2015 but declined in the spring of 2016 when it averaged -30. 
This was followed by a sharp fall after the referendum. Satisfaction leaped upwards in 





her snap election net satisfaction was -1. As the government’s record came under 
scrutiny in the campaign, it fell to -15, some 4-points lower than it had been in 2015. 
 




Source: Ipsos MORI 
 
It is still possible for governments with negative net levels of satisfaction to 
win re-election, however. It was no impediment to the Conservatives in 1983, 1987 
and 1992. It was no impediment to Labour in 2001 and 2005. Figure 8.5 displays the 
association between net satisfaction and the government’s share of the Labour–
Conservative vote—the votes secured by the two main parties of government—in 
thirteen general elections from 1970.49 Net satisfaction is positively correlated with 
vote for the governing party: the higher the satisfaction, the higher the expected 
vote.50 Figure 8.5 suggests that the Tories’ share of the two-party vote in 2017 is 
pretty much what one might expect given net satisfaction. Fom this perspective, the 











Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Competence and trust 
Elections do not simply provide voters with a chance to cast judgments on 
incumbents—they also provide voters with a choice between competing futures. Both 
the policies offered to voters and prospective evaluations of competence matter. By 
April 2017 large portions of the electorate thought that the Tories had a poor record 
but were still more competent than Labour. This can be simply illustrated by 
responses to YouGov’s regular questions about which party was best able to handle 
certain problems, such as the NHS, economy and Brexit, and which are reported by 
Nicholas Allen in table 1.3.51. The evidence shows that Labour was generally 
advantaged on the issues of the NHS and housing, while the Conservatives were 
advantaged on security issues like law and order, immigration and the economy. 
Indeed, the Conservatives lead on the economy actually grew, which is striking given 





16-points. By mid-April it had increased to 24-points. Doubts about Labour were 
clearly a major of Tory advantage.  
 





Source: British Election Study 
 
Since the issue of immigration has attracted a lot of attention it is worth noting 
that the Conservatives were effective in persuading the electorate that they would 
‘take back control’ of the borders. One indicator of the Tories’ progress on the issue is 
provided by responses to a question posed by the BES: ‘Would any of the following 
political parties be successful … in reducing the level of immigration?’ Figure 8.6 
displays the net score—the percentage saying the party would reduce immigration 
minus the percentage saying they would not reduce—for both the Conservative and 
Labour parties over time. The Tories initially struggled to convince on immigration. 
In April/May 2016 their net score was -51. It was still negative by November/ 





embrace of the referendum result and the prime minister’s rhetoric about taking back 
control reduced this negative. Evaluations of Labour, by contrast, did not improve.  
Ironically, the Conservative achievement in reassuring more voters that they 
could control the borders had a less positive effect than it might have. In the run up to 
the 2017 election, there was no repeat of the European-wide migration crisis of 
previous summers and the issue was less visible. Fewer voters thought immigration 
was ‘the most important issue’ by the time the Tories had persuaded the electorate 
that they were taking back control. Their advantage over Labour thus counted for less. 
 
A campaign that mattered 
When the prime minister announced she would seek an early election, the Tories were 
around 20-points ahead in the polls. Labour appeared to be floundering. In the first 
couple of weeks of the campaign Conservative support fluctuated around 46 per cent. 
From around 14 May it drifted down a little but rallied to around 44 per cent on the 
eve of the election. Support for Labour, by contrast, started in the mid-20s and trended 
upwards remorselessly, as shown in figure 1.5. By late May it had increased to the 
mid-30s as former Greens, Liberal Democrats, abstainers and Tory Remainers flocked 
to Labour. By early June Labour appeared almost to have closed the gap, although the 
final polls gave the Tories a lead of 8 points. In the event, these polls understated 
Labour’s share by 4 points and overstated the Tories by about 2 points, massively 
overestimating the actual 2.4-point lead. 
The improvement in Labour’s standing over the course of the campaign was 
the largest ever observed ahead of any general election since polling began in 1945. 
There does not appear to be any obvious turning point, such as that which was 





not quite linear trends in both major parties’ poll ratings suggest that their vote shares 
were returning to their long-term levels based on the policy mood, economic 
conditions and satisfaction with the government’s record. There are good reasons for 
thinking that the campaign had an almost catalytic effect on vote choice. 
 
From ‘strong and stable’ to ‘weak and wobbly’ 
A great deal of the Conservative campaign was carried on the shoulders of Theresa 
May. Her elevation to the prime ministership less than a year before had appeared to 
represent a break with the past, as described by Nicholas Allen in chapter 1. David 
Cameron, George Osborne and Michael Gove, the modernising members of the 
‘Notting Hill set’, all left the cabinet, and May pointedly distanced herself 
government from the ‘privileged few’. She promised to protect workers’ rights after 
Brexit and have workers serve on the boards of companies. She even proposed to 
impose controls on energy prices. The 2017 manifesto declared: ’We must reject the 
ideological templates provided by the socialist left and the libertarian right and instead 
embrace the mainstream view that recognises the good that government can do’.53 
May promised a different style of leadership appropriate to a national 
emergency. She was described, and liked to think of herself, as a ‘bloody difficult 
woman’.54 Her pledge to provide ‘strong and stable government in the national 
interest’ was repeated ad nauseam. The implicit claim was that she was a leader in the 
mould of Margaret Thatcher, who would bring the warring factions in her own party 
together, win an election and use her enhanced authority to get the best deal from the 
EU. This idea was appealing to many worried about Britain’s post-Brexit future.  
Although May promised change it was slow to materialise. The shift in the 





popular manifesto proposal was to increase spending on the NHS by at least £8 
billion. This secured 79 per cent support.55 Nevertheless, the Tories continued to 
emphasise fiscal prudence. She told a nurse who had not had a pay rise in seven years: 
‘there’s no magic money tree’.56  
Other polices raised questions about whether the prime minister offered 
change. Her commitment to lift the ban on new selective schools was straight out of 
the Thatcher playbook, offering opportunity to a few gifted children from less 
advantaged backgrounds. Her commitment to allowing a ‘free vote’ on hunting with 
dogs—an issue that animated a small minority of the landed wealthy—seemed 
incompatible with the pledge not to govern in the interests of the privileged few. 
‘Stability’ was reassuring if you thought that the country was going in the right 
direction. It was not reassuring if you thought that it was not. 
In 2007, following series of political calamities and policy failures, the Liberal 
Democrat Vince Cable produced one of the most famous put-downs in British 
parliamentary history. He said of Gordon Brown, the then prime minister: ‘The house 
has noticed [his] remarkable transformation in the past few weeks from Stalin to Mr 
Bean, creating chaos out of order, rather than order out of chaos’.57 Brown’s 
reputation never recovered. Theresa May underwent a similar transformation from 
April to June 2017, from being ‘strong and stable’ to ‘weak and wobbly’. The 
immediate cause of her fall in public esteem related to policy. As Nicholas Allen 
recounts in chapter 1, the Conservative manifesto made bold proposals to fund social 
care that alarmed pensioners. After a few days of token resistance the prime minister 
announced a U-turn right in the middle of the campagn. This may have not been quite 
so damaging if it had not followed two other U-turns. The government had backed 





minister then performed the mother of all U-turns and announced the election. This 
new U-turn was part of an emerging pattern –and it was at odds with the prime 
minister’s self-image. 
Theresa May might have been less damaged by these changes had she 
admitted to her mistakes. Instead, she tried to maintain her reputation by repeating 
‘Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed’. A YouGov poll found that while 33 per 
cent said that U-turns are ‘a good sign—showing they [politicians] are willing to 
listen and change their minds’, 37 per cent said that ‘U-turns are normally a bad 
sign—showing they are incompetent, weak, or have not thought their policies through 
properly in advance’.58 The week before the manifesto launch a YouGov poll had 
suggested that 25 per cent thought the Conservative party had ‘lots of policies that 
seem well thought through’ and just 20 per cent thought that they ‘have lots of 
policies, but they don’t seem very well thought through’. One week later 12 per cent 
thought that they had well thought through policies and 32 per cent thought that they 
did not.  
May had promised new policies and a new style of leadership. The new 
policies were constrained by ideology and inertia. Her leadership was undermined by 
a tendency to change her mind under pressure. Her preference for carefully controlled 
media events and her refusal to take part in the televised debates sealed her growing 
reputation for insecurity. The Conservative party’s advantage on competence nose-
dived across every issue from mid-May onwards. So did assessments of May as the 
‘best prime minister’. Conservative support was shallow indeed.  
Despite the failures of her campaign, Theresa May still enjoyed a lead of 12-
points over Jeremy Corbyn on the question of who would make the best prime 





had enjoyed over Ed Miliband two years earlier and far smaller than May’s apparent 
lead in April. The movement in the polls and outcome confirmed that she was not the 
awesome electoral weapon that she or her advisers assumed. Nevertheless, 
comparisons of the two leaders in 2017 still probably benefited the Conservatives. 
Some 93 per cent of Tory voters thought that she would make the best prime minister, 
compared with just 55 per cent of Labour voters who thought the same of Corbyn. 
 
‘Jez we can’ 
The Labour election campaign began with low expectations. Labour MPs trooped 
back to their constituencies convinced that they would be hammered at the polls. 
Some decided to ignore the national campaign and fight on their own records. Many 
did not extend the customary invitations to their leader to visit their constituency. 
Jeremy Corbyn was thought to be a handicap rather than a source of appeal.59  
Despite these forebodings, the first few days of the campaign witnessed a rise 
of around 4-points in support for Labour in the YouGov polls.60 This was simply the 
result of former Labour voters returning home or anti-Conservative voters shifting to 
Labour when they realised that their preferred candidate could not win in their 
constituency. As the campaign wore on the election came to be seen as a two-horse 
race between the Conservative and Labour parties outside Northern Ireland, including, 
to some extent, in Scotland. Labour’s share in the polls trended upwards. Even 
campaign gaffes, such as Diane Abbott’s inability to cost Labour’s policies on 
policing on 27 April, had no visible impact.  
Ironically, given Corbyn’s reciprocated antipathy towards Tony Blair, 
Labour’s campaign slogan ‘For the many, not the few’ was drawn from the new 





something of a whiff of New Labour in the central proposition of the party’s 
manifesto that there could be improvements in public services by raising levels of 
corporation tax and income tax levels on the wealthiest 5 per cent. The proposal that 
corporations and the rich should pay more tax matched the leftward drift in the policy 
mood. Between 18-19 May, YouGov found that 58 per cent supported increasing the 
top rate of income tax.61 Another proposal to cap rent rises in line with inflation was 
supported by 65 per cent. The party’s commitments to nationalise the railways, the 
national grid and water companies were not quite as popular, but still secured the 
approval of 46 per cent. Proposals to abolish tuition fees were wildly popular with 
young people and 49 per cent of the public in total supported this proposal.  
The manifesto helped to reassure voters abut Labour. At the start of May only 
10 per cent of YouGov respondents thought that Labour had ‘lots of policies that 
seem well thought through’ and 20 per cent thought they ‘don’t have many policies 
and those they do have are not well thought through’. By the end of May these figures 
had changed to 24 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. This did not represent a 
transformation but it suggested that Labour was being given a hearing. The popularity 
of Labour’s policies contributed to the reduction in the Conservatives advantage on 
competence from mid-May onwards across all issues. 
 Both the Conservatives and Labour were hampered by their associations with 
past failures, which made them vulnerable to populist appeals. Theresa May tried to 
put distance between her and Cameron by claiming to govern on behalf of the 
‘mainstream’ but was hampered by the fact that she had served for seven years in his 
cabinet. Jeremy Corbyn, on the other hand, was a genuine outsider. As Thomas Quinn 
describes in chapter 2, his elevation to the leadership and the refusal of long-serving 





front bench, promoting many people who were neither associated with Blair and New 
Labour or with the financial crash under Gordon Brown. The public did notice the 
splits in Labour but these developments enhanced Corbyn’s status as an outsider. 
Labour’s manifesto energised its members. Corbyn’s election as leader had 
presaged a significant boost in Labour’s membership to over 500,000 compared with 
the Tories 180,000. These new members brought and energy and commitment to the 
business of campaigning. Many had learned how to use social media to mobilise 
support for Corbyn in the two Labour leadership contests of 2015 and 2016. They 
now applied these methods to campaign on behalf of Labour in the country. Blogs 
such as the Canary and Another Angry Voice churned out arguments to support 
Labour and rebuttals to counter the pro-Conservative bias of the national press. 
Younger voters in particular relied on social media for their news and opinions. Those 
who relied on these sources were, in turn, more likely to vote Labour.62
The influx of new members undoubtedly had another positive effect on 
Labour’s campaign: it meant that there was a larger number of people to deliver 
leaflets, canvass potential voters and mobilise the vote. In some places the official 
Labour campaign was supplemented by contributions from Momentum, the grass-
roots movement that was formed to support Corbyn. Some of this activity may have 
duplicated the official Labour campaign so it is difficult to establish its unique impact. 
For the first two or three weeks of the campaign, Labour appeared to be fighting a 
defensive campaign and focussed on consolidating its safe seats. Some Labour MPs 
ran a campaign that emphasised their constituency service and distanced themselves 
from the national campaign and their leader. There is evidence that such MPs fared 





 The leftward shift of the electorate, the deteriorating economy and the low 
esteem in which the government was held, together with Labour’s policy appeal and 
the energetic campaigns waged by Labour, led to a rise in evaluations of Labour’s 
competence and Corbyn’s personal standing during the campaign. Yet as noted above, 
only just over a half of Labour voters reported that he would make the best prime 
minister. Around one in ten Labour voters reported that Theresa May would make the 
best prime minister, and around one-third reported that either that neither would or 
that they didn’t know. The euphoria that followed the election outcome cannot 
obscure the fact that evaluations of Corbyn’s as a potential prime minister held 
Labour back in 2017.  
 
The electoral system: the other national lottery 
The electoral system mechanically translates votes into seats by applying the plurality 
rule in all the UK’s 650 constituencies. This simple rule states that the candidate with 
the most votes wins. Nevertheless, the way in which it transforms votes into seats at 
the national level is difficult to predict because so much depends on the geographical 
distribution of the vote.  
The plurality electoral system has been described as ‘Britain’s other national 
lottery’.64 The simplest way to illustrate the weird and wonderful way that it operates 
is to examine the seats-to-votes (s/v) ratios i.e. the percentage of seats won by party X 
divided by the percentage of votes won by the same party. These ratios vary across 
parties and time. The system penalises parties that have wide but geographically 
dispersed support. The s/v ratio for the Liberal Democrats, for example, has varied 
between 0.2 and 0.4. The system generally favours parties that have either 





and Labour, for example, usually exceed 1. The governing party usually enjoys a 
winner’s bonus so that its s/v exceeds that of the opposition. In 2017 the s/v ratio was 
1.2 for the Conservatives and 1.0 for Labour.  
One of the reasons why the s/v ratio was higher for the Tories in 2017 was that 
the average plurality was 13,423 for seats won by Labour and 12,481 for seats won by 
the Conservatives. In places like Liverpool and London, Labour piled up massive 
pluralities in some constituencies. This may be related to Labour’s campaign, which 
initially focussed on consolidating their core seats. To be sure, the Conservatives piled 
up impressive majorities in more rural or gentrified places North East Hampshire, 
Maidenhead, East Hampshire, North Dorset and Meon Valley. On average, however, 
the Tory vote was more efficiently distributed than Labour. Other factors such as the 
number of voters in a constituency and differences in turnout can also influence the 
s/v, since—other things being equal—it takes fewer votes to win a constituency with 
fewer voters.65 
The unpredictable operation of the electoral system in 2017 can be illustrated 
by comparing it with previous general elections. Figure 8.7 displays the s/v ratio for 
the party that went on to form the government between 1945 and 2017. The ratio has 
varied from a low of 1.07 in 1951, to a high of 1.56 in 2005. In principle, therefore, 
the system could translate 42.3 per cent of the vote into anything from (42.3 × 1.07 =) 
45.3 per cent of the seats in the ‘worst’ year for the governing party to (42.3 × 1.56 =) 
66.0 per cent in the ‘best’ year. In 2017 the s/v ratio was only 1.14 and the 
Conservatives only obtained 48.5 per cent of seats. By contrast, a Labour lead of 2.8 
points in 2005 translated into 355 seats and a majority of 66. In 2017 a similar Tory 











Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In short, Theresa May gambled the Conservative party’s 2015 majority on her 
personal appeal, the weakness of the opposition and the lottery that is the electoral 
system—and she lost. 
The 2017 general election also resulted in the re-establishment of traditional 
patterns of party competition at the constituency level.66 Table 8.6 shows which two 
parties were in first or second place at selected general elections. The traditional 
pattern is illustrated by 1966. In that election the Conservatives or Labour came either 
first or second in 574 constituencies. By 2010 this figure had fallen to just 286 seats. 
From the 1970s onwards, the Liberals and their successors became the second placed 
competitors in many seats held by the major parties. In 2010 the Liberal Democrats 
came second in 245 seats. They also won 58 seats. The post-coalition backlash in 
2015 left the Liberal Democrats in second place in just 46 seats. Labour’s revival in 





years. The Liberal Democrats came second in just 35 seats (28 Tory-held and seven 
Labour seats). The collapse of UKIP, however, meant that two major parties filled the 
top two places in 522 seats. Had Scotland not been dominated by competition 
between Unionists and SNP, the circle from 1966 to 2017 would have been complete. 
Superficially at least, Britain had returned to ‘traditional’ two-party politics. Future 
electoral contests look likely to be framed in a different way from now on. 
 
TABLE 8.6: The numbers of constituencies according to which parties occupied first 
and second places at selected elections 
 
First place  Second place 1966 2010 2015 2017 
Con Lab 222 139 207 276 
Lab Con 352 147 169 246 
Lib Dem Con 19 167 46 28 
Lab Lib Dem 10 38 4 8 
Lib Dem Lab 7 78 0 7 
Other*  5 46 203 66 
 
* These figures exclude the seat won by the speaker of the House of Commons, 
traditionally not contested by the main parties 
 
Source: Johnston et al., ‘Coming Full Circle: the 2017 UK General Election and the 




This chapter has sought to explain why the Conservatives lost their majority but still 
won. Important parts of the story have been covered in other chapters. As John 
Curtice has shown in chapter 3 and as Paul Whiteley, Harold Clarke and Matthew 
Goodwin have shown in chapter 4, the collapse of the Liberal Democrats from 2010 
and UKIP after 2016 meant that that, across most of the UK, the choice effectively 
boiled down to that of either a Conservative or Labour government. This chapter has 





shifted leftwards in response to austerity and tax cuts. The post-referendum economy 
was subject to uncertainty and the Conservative government had a weak record. The 
Tories fought a dull and uninspiring campaign, while Labour caught both the policy 
and anti-system moods of the times. The electoral system funnelled this mess of 
motivations and causes into choices. A broad electoral coalition was formed out of 
traditional Labour voters, former non-voters, former Greens, former Conservative 
Remainers, former Liberal Democrats and Unionist social democrats in Scotland. The 
electoral system transformed these changes into a hung parliament. 
At this point it is perhaps worth remembering that it is always easier to explain 
(or rationalise) than to predict. All but one of the brave forecasters who put their 
reputations on the line in 2017 had their fingers burnt.67 Curiously, none felt the need 
to incorporate either the policy mood or policy into their forecasting models. Nor did 
they factor in the impact of the party campaigns. It may well be that the 2017 election 
is a one-off with little to teach us about elections in general. Yet, if the 2017 election 
has any lesson for students of British politics, it is surely that policy and unpredictable 
campaigns can matter. That being so, would-be forecasters are well-advised to heed 
Winston Churchill’s advice to politicians: those seeking to predict election results 
need ‘the ability to foretell what is going to happen, tomorrow, next week, next month 
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